Breaking down the barriers of the traditional understanding of the Xiongnu people create an environment and historical vision where the Xiongnu were in fact resilient without the need/presence of Han influence. The heqin[1] was a period of high diplomatic and social activity between the Xiongnu and Han, however, prior to the heqin, open communication and Chinese influence was absent within Xiongnu society.[2] By the same token, “…relations between the Han dynasty and the Xiongnu resulted in increased exchanges in terms of technology and material culture, signs of direct Chinese presence or “influence” in the steppe before then are far less clear and should be interpreted with great caution.”[3] The high agricultural output and developed silk market demonstrate a reason for the preservation of various Xiongnu settlements. Preservation of the settlements was not the cause of Han (Chinese) influence, but to the symbiotic relationship between Xiongnu rulers and their population.[4] There is no doubt that the Xiongnu conquest over various territories led to the increase of workers, soldiers, and farmers that contributed to the growth of their labor force. However, the increase in the Xiongnu labor force was only a fractional element that led to their overwhelming and temporary success in preserving controlled land.[5] “If this is accepted—and clearly the mixed origin of artifacts and implements would lead us to think so—then we should come to the conclusion that the Xiongnu conquest brought an increment, rather than a decrease, of agricultural and handicraft production in the areas under their domination.”[6] The conquered territories by the Xiongnu mostly occurred shortly after the turn of the 2nd Century BC where Xiongnu militants exercised control over (semi)sedentary groups not only along the Chinese border to the west, but also in the north.[7] “In this view it is more likely that Ivolga gorodishche and other similar fortified settlements in the Baikal region were originally inhabited by northern enemies of the Xiongnu, such as the Dingling, and later occupied by the Xiongnu, who imposed their rule over a nucleus of pre-existing, ethnically different people.[8] As mentioned earlier, there was no concrete evidence of any colonial uprising by the settled population of these various conquered settlements along the Chinese border. A “symbiotic” relationship was present that ultimately led to the decrease of tensions between the settled population and the colonizing force, i.e., Xiongnu.[9]
In the regions north of early China, a symbiotic relationship between Xiongnu rulers and the settled populations existed and led to an interdependent economic system where agricultural output was directly correlated to the climate.[10] When the Xiongnu empire was severely weakened near 88 BC, it was not a result of the Xiongnu cutting ties with the Han and the dissolvement of the thriving economy, but because the absence of revenue streams going into the Xiongnu empire ended, leaving them vulnerable to harsh climate and persistent natural disaster.[11] Short-term Han military expeditions sent into the Xiongnu territories past the Great Wall collected grain and cereals that overtime, weakened the Xiongnu empire and would eventually lead to their demise as a political entity in the region.[12] Because the interdependence between the Han and Xiongnu ended, the Xiongnu were backed into a corner and were forced to adopt an earlier framework of modest economic interaction with closer nation-states and nomadic tribes.[13] A subsistence economy was really the only viable option the Xiongnu had due to the absence of revenue streams that defined Han-Xiongnu relations earlier in Han Wudi’s reign.[14] Han revenue streams were originally distributed to average members of the Xiongnu community that sparked the growth of political unions and rewards packages to workers and farmers across the Xiongnu territories.[15] The decrease and ultimate stop to the Han revenue streams also led to the decline in Xiongnu social functions that gave workers and farmers (loyal members of the Xiongnu) dignity and humanity. “The nomads, as we have shown above, could and did survive without China but could no longer survive if China (or any other enemy) deprived them of their means of livelihood.”[16]
This paradox of Xiongnu survival can be unpacked and further understood with textual evidence and literature. Han actions designed to reduce the political power of the Xiongnu was what led to their demise as an entity along the steppe. Furthermore, it is also plausible that much of the revenue streams were monopolized by the elite of the Xiongnu and utilized for personal gain at the expense of the average farmers and labor workers.[17] The Xiongnu could live without the help from the Han, however, a majority of the Xiongnu people could not be able to live if the Xiongnu elite did not ‘share the wealth’ in a way. Early forms of “trickle-down” economics were formed where the elite would try and redistribute the revenue streams to people in a lower economic percentile.[18] If Han revenue was not redistributed properly, then the Xiongnu people would become more vulnerable to political instability as political unions were be weakened as mentioned earlier. Although Wudi of Han’s harsh policies affected the Xiongnu population, Han military expeditions did not fully decimate the Xiongnu territories.[19] Xiongnu leadership, weakened by its inability to steer out of the way of Han influence, did not have the political and social power to reduce the declining status and health of the nomadic economy; this weakened economy forced nomads to consume and compete over declining (scarce) resources across the Central Asian Steppe.[20] Overtime, the Xiongnu adopted forms of subsistence farming where workers would only grow and harvest limited amounts of crop goods to meet the needs (demands) of their families and greater communities across the steppe.[21] Throughout the period of Han-Xiongnu relations, peace never lasted long! There was no global order that dictated peace between nation-states, and certainly no order to alleviate tense relations with nomadic groups. It was strictly the responsibility of the Han court and the Xiongnu to establish, preserve, and maintain relations with one another.
Although trade along the silk road remained vibrant with touches of conflict present, after the Mongolian conquest of greater Eurasia, the fate of the Silk Road was in the hands of Genghis Khan and his descendants.[22] Although Xinru Liu argued that civilizations and trade cities along the Silk Road were destroyed through the Mongol conquest and the greater effects of the pax-Mongolica, other historians such as Christopher Beckwith have argued that the Mongols established the first international trade network.[23] The Mongols, like any other dynasty or faction before them, utilized the Silk Road for trade and the sharing of religious ideas. The Mongols monopolized the international market that was the Silk Road and controlled much of the transnational silk market.[24] Genghis Khan wrote,
As my quiver bearers are black like a thick forest and [my] wives, spouses [sic] and daughters glitter and sparkle like a red hot fire, my desire and intention for all is such: to delight their mouths with the sweetness of the sugar and benevolence, to adorn them front and back, top and bottom, with garments of gold brocade. To sit them on fluid paced mounts, to give them pure and delicious water to drink, to provide verdant pastures for their herds.[25]
The ortaq, referring to the Mongolian’s trade and tax system, played an important role in the monopolization of the Silk Road.[26] The Mongolian Empire ultimately utilized the Silk Road as an effective means of recruitment for their future conquests.[27] Shortly after the introduction of Mongolian influence along the Silk Road, the Central Asian steppe would once again become the connection between the east and west with a growing and vibrant center of international commerce. “For a century or so the Central Asian steppe was once again the link between Europe and China, as Mongol conquerors facilitated commercial and cultural exchanges on the Eurasian land routes.”[28] The Mongolian conquest in southern China, south of the Yangzi River created a space that allowed the Mongols to trade with nations off mainland China. Foreign trade near the coast was huge, due to Mongolian presence in southern China.[29] “The Mongol rulers had long been familiar with this community of merchants and readily hired them as ortogs to carry out the trade with peoples living in the Southeast Asian archipelagos and to sustain long-standing connections with the Indian Ocean commercial networks.”[30] At this point in history, silk made up only a fraction of all the goods exported out of China which allowed other economic spheres of influence to grow.
[1] The heqin period was a system of diplomatic and trade relations between the Xiongnu and Han dynasty created by Emperor Gaozu of the Han. Silk, grain, and bullion were given annually to the Xiongnu in order to reduce violent conflict/tension between the two states.
[2] Di Cosmo, Nicola. “Ancient Inner Asian Nomads: Their Economic Basis and its Significance in Chinese History.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 53, no.4 (1994).
[3] Ibid, 1114.
[4] Ibid, 1115.
[5] Ibid, 1115.
[6] Ibid, 1115.
[7] Ibid, 1115.
[8] Ibid, 1115.
[9] Ibid, 1115.
[10] Ibid, 1115.
[11] Ibid, 1118.
[12] Ibid, 1110.
[13] Ibid, 1118.
[14] Ibid, 1117.
[15] Ibid, 1117.
[16] Ibid, 1117.
[17] Ibid, 1117.
[18] Ibid, 1117.
[19] Ibid, 1117.
[20] Ibid, 1117.
[21] Ibid, 1118.
[22] Liu, Xinru. Silk Road in World History. (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2010), 109.
[23] Beckwith, Christopher I, Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 201.
[24] Ibid, 110.
[25] Liu, Xinru. The Silk Road in World History. Cary: (Oxford University Press, 2010), 109.
[26] Beckwith, Christopher I, Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 201.
[27] Liu, Xinru. The Silk Road in World History. Cary: (Oxford University Press, 2010), 109.
[28] Ibid, 109.
[29] Ibid, 124.
[30] Ibid, 124.
